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ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS FOR IDENTICAL AND HETEROGENEOUS
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

In the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, developing countries (DCs) were adamant that in order to
protect the environment for the future, new institutions were needed which would channel resources
from the wealthy developed countries to the poor DCs. With this backdrop, I analyze the problem
faced by an imperfectly informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) who wishes to
design an International Environmental Agreement (lEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with
polluting firms in the various DCs, and he must deal with such firms through their governments.
Further, the SNGA is constrained by limited financial resources available for environmental
protection. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction, first for the case in which the relevant DCs
are identical; I then analyze the case of heterogeneous DCs. I find that the monetary transfers
necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are quite sensitive to both the timing
of the underlying game and to the existence of collusion. Inter alia, my analysis suggests that IEAs
are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem arising from national
sovereignty. However, the success of such IEAs is contingent on the funds available for global
environmental protection.
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ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS FOR IDENTICAL AND HETEROGENEOUS
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES!

1. Introduction

With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental protection
is a global issue. As noted by Bernauer (1995, p. 354), the scope and significance of this issue have
been amply demonstrated by the events of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. At this summit, it became
clear that if the developed countries of the world wanted " . .. the environment to be secured for
future generations, [then they would] have to radically assist the South in choosing a different road
to development than the one they [had] currently [been] travelling on" (Rogers 1993, p. 27). Indeed,
to combat the twin evils of poverty and environmental degradation, developing countries (Des) have
demanded the transfer of resources and technology from developed countries. In such a contentious
setting, the success or failure to protect the environment will depend crucially on the ability of
international institutions to craft effective international environmental agreements (IEAs). 2 Given
this, a key question becomes "How can international institutions, which necessarily respect the
principle of state sovereignty, contribute to the solution of difficult global problems?" (Keohane,
Haas, and Levy 1993, p. 6). This is the main question that I propose to analyze in this paper.

IThis paper has benefitted from the comments ofLany Karp. I acknowledge financial support from the Faculty
Research Grant program at Utah State University and from the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State
University, Logan, UT 84322-4810. Approved as journal paper No. 5028. The usual disclaimer applies.
2In this paper I shall use the terms IEA and contract interchangeably.
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On the academic front, researchers have begun to study Issues relating to global
environmental protection in a systematic manner only very recently. 3 As a result, many specific
questions remain unanswered. What kinds of pollution abatement patterns can one expect to observe
in situations in which an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA)
contracts with governments and polluting firms in individual Des?

What kinds of monetary

transfers will be necessary to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate in IEAs? How does
the contract, which treats Des as identical, differ from one which acknowledges the heterogeneity
of Des? How does the SNGAs inability to monitor pollution abatement in the individual countries
affect the contract design question? Finally, how does the limited availability of funds affect the
SNGAs contract design question? These are some of the specific questions that I shall address in
this paper.
I shall build on the economics of hierarchies to study the global pollution control question

as a problem in mechanism design.

This perspective not only highlights the effect of key

informational asymmetries on the design of contracts, but it also provides interesting insights into
the kinds of pollution control arrangements one might expect to observe in an inherently hierarchical
and noncooperative international environment. Although my analysis is in principle applicable to
any country, the hierarchical interaction that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to Des; as such,
the reader should note that it is these countries that I have in mind in all of the subsequent analyses.4

3See Bernauer (1995) and Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim.

4The countries I have in mind are those which would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under the Global
Environmental Facility' s (GEF) standard of per capita income of $4,000 or less. For more details see Rogers (1993, p.
155).
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I now discuss the nascent literature on lEAs and then move on to provide a detailed discussion of
my model.
2. International Environmental Agreements: A Brief Synopsis

Barrett (1992, 1994) has modeled lEAs as games between countries. While Barrett's
analyses are not in the design framework, he makes the important point that for lEAs to work at all,
they must be self enforcing. Hoel (1992) argues against the institution of uniform emissions
reduction policies in international agreements, showing that other policies yield higher levels of
global welfare. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) show that a large enough group of environmentally
conscious countries can make self-financing side payments to a group of less environmentally
conscious countries so as to produce a stable coalition which leads to lower overall pollution
emissions. While these papers have certainly advanced our understanding of some aspects of
" ... the multi-faceted design . .. problem," (Black, Levi, and de Meza 1993, p. 281), many other
important questions-which I discussed in section I-remain unanswered. As such, I now discuss
my modeling approach to the lEA design question.
I shall model the international environment as a multiforked, three-tiered hierarchy.
Occupying the topmost tier of the hierarchy is the relevant international institution, which I shall call
a SNGA. This SNGA could be an organization such as the World Bank,5 or the Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD) created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit. The second and

5S pecifically in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
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third tiers of the hierarchy consist of the government and a representative polluting firm in each DC.
Each fork of the hierarchy corresponds to a single DC, and there are N such forks/countries .6
Three-tiered hierarchies have been studied by Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993 ),
and by Batabyal (1996a, 1996b).

Batabyal (1996b) compares two-tiered hierarchies with

three-tiered hierarchies and shows that the timing of the game played by the relevant players does
not have a significant bearing on the nature of the lEA that can be designed by a SNGA. However,
to the best of my knowledge, the problem of designing lEAs for identical and heterogeneous DCs,
when there are budget balance constraints and when governments and firms within a country may
collude, has not been studied to date.
As such, I shall apply the theory of hierarchies to study the design of lEAs, first for identical

DCs, and then for heterogeneous DCs. The reader should think of the identical DC's case as one
in which the SNGA seeks to avoid the transaction costs associated with the design of
country-specific lEAs. As a result, the SNGA holds all DCs, which fall within a particular criterion,
to identical contractual requirements. As indicated in footnote 4, one such criterion might be the
GEFs standard of per capita income of$4,000 or less. From the perspective of the SNGA, this case
of identical DCs involves ex ante contracting. 7 In particular, the SNGA is constrained by an ex ante
budget constraint. This kind of budget constraint makes sense only when all the relevant countries

6The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred on the SNGA, the role of principal. As
such, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power of the SNGA as opposed to that of governments and firms .
However, given that I am interested in DCs which typically have limited bargaining power in their dealings with
international organizations owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations are
minimal, this hierarchical modeling scheme appears to be appropriate. For more on the power of SNGAs over DCs, see
Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (199 1).
7By ex ante I mean contracting which takes place with all parties holding symmetric but imperfect information
about the pollution abatement technology of firms. By ex post I mean contracting which takes place with the players
holding asymmetric information about the pollution abatement technology of the same firms.
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are identical and when there is no aggregate uncertainty. As contrasted to this case, the case in
which DCs are heterogeneous involves ex post contracting for the SNGA. Here, the SNGAs' actions
are constrained by ex post budget constraints, and the designed lEAs are country specific.
The rationale for ex ante and ex post contracting stems from issues including, but not limited
to, the harmful atmospheric effects of sulphur and/or nitrogen emissions. The actual incidence of
pollution may be domestic or transboundary.8 The uncertainty in this paper arises from the SNGAs'
lack of knowledge about the quality of the pollution abatement technology available in each DC.
This lack of knowledge about abatement technology quality is the source of imperfect and
asymmetric information. Whereas the firm in the DC always knows the quality of its technology
and the government does too in some states of nature, the SNGA is never privy to this information.
The random variable denoting the private information about pollution abatement technology quality
is uncorrelated across countries. In the ex ante case, this no-correlation assumption does not have
any impact because all countries are identical, and, hence, my analysis involves the study of the
SNGAIgovernmentifirm interaction in a single DC. However, in the ex post case, the no-correlation
assumption means that my analysis of the three-tiered interaction between the SNGA, the
government, and the polluting firm in one country is independent of the SNGAs' dealings with some
other country. Hence, without any loss of generality, I shall focus on an arbitrary country, say
country j, in the finite set of countries. The SNGA's task is to design incentive compatible and
collusion-proof ex ante and ex post IEAs which can be implemented in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3, I describe the model in detail and
I study the properties of the first best optimum. In section 4, I study ex ante and ex post contracting,

8S ee Crane (1993) and Paarlberg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when the
incidence of an environmental externality is domestic.
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with no collusion by the firm and the government. In section 5, I study ex ante and ex post
contracting with possible collusion by the government and the polluting firm. In addition to the
identical DC versus heterogeneous DC interpretation of ex ante and ex post contracting that has
already been provided, the reader should also think of this distinction as one involving liability. This
issue concerns the potential need for limiting the ex post liability of the players in the various
nations, in order to get them to voluntarily participate in the contracting process. In other words,
as contrasted to an ex ante contract, an ex post contract is like a limited liability contract. That is,
the SNGA limits the maximum loss of the relevant players in the event of an adverse state of nature.
The reasons for wanting to study collusion between the polluting firm and the LDC
government are threefold. First, while the DC government participates in the lEA because it
recognizes the value of such international participation, this government also acts as the polluting
firm's advocate. This aspect of the problem will give rise to scenarios in which government/firm
collusion becomes a desirable option. 9 Second, the government and the firm receive monetary
transfers from the SNGA for their roles in abating pollution. Further, both these players know that
the SNGA cannot monitor their activities owing to sovereignty, or for that matter, enforce the terms
of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. As such, there will be circumstances in which there
are incentives for the government and the firm in each country to collude to maximize the transfers
received from the SNGA. Third, as Mookherjee and Png (1995) have noted, corruption is an
endemic part of public life in many DCs. This suggests a need for explicitly modeling the activities
of potentially corruptible players. Due to these three reasons, an important part of this paper will
consist of analyzing collusion-proof contracts.
9See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible government/fIrm collusion in an
international setting.
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3. The Theoretical Framework

3a. Description of the Model
Subscript i = 1, 2, 3, 4 will refer to the state of nature, and superscript) = 1, .. . , N will refer
to the country. 8 denotes the uncertainty about the quality of the pollution abatement technology
that is currently available; 8 has binary support

[8, 8],

where

°< 8 < 8, and Ll8

==

8 - 8.

I

8 as the low abatement quality parameter and to 8 as the high abatement quality

shall refer to
parameter.

The risk-averse firm produces clean air, whose output and value are denoted by XEIR +' The
firm chooses a level of pollution abatement aE IR++' The firms cost of abatement is g(a), where

g/> 0, and g

//>

0, and g(O)

=

0. The firm has a differentiable net payoff from pollution abatement

function B[ Ti - g (a)] with CB [• ] / aTi E ( 0, 00 ), VTi .

r;

E IR +

is the monetary transfer made by the

SNGA to the firm for abating pollution in state i. The firm's reservation payoff is Br

=

B

[~. ] ,

and

Tr is the reservation transfer. Br and Tr are common knowledge.
The DC government is risk averse. It has a strictly concave and differentiable utility function

V(G) , with

v' (. )E (0 , 00), VG i . Gi is the monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the government

for its role in participating in the IEA in state i.

v;. = V(G r)'
employing

The government's reservation utility is

where GrEIR +is the reservation transfer, and Vr and Gr are common knowledge. By

a monitoring

device, the government receives a signal, s, from the firm regarding its

private information and then it sends a report, r, to the SNGA indicating what it observed about the
firm' s pollution abatement technology quality parameter. l O In some states of nature, this monitoring

lOSince the main objective of this paper is not to study domestic monitoring, I shall assume that the use of this
monitoring device is costless.
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device malfunctions and hence in these states, the government will be unable to provide the SNGA
with a useful report. Upon receiving r, the SNGA offers the government a transfer. Making the
government's central task one of reporting is consistent with the government/SNGA interaction
proposed for one specific SNGA, the Commission on Sustainable Development. As noted by
Rogers

(1993,

p.

310),

a

key

aspect

of

this

interaction

involves

the

". . . Commission's . . . considering information provided by governments . . ." 11
The SNGA is risk neutral and he has a welfare function
U = Li( a i

+

~.),

which takes the form

8" - Gi - Ti), } = 1, ... JV, where} runs over the total number of countries. Clean

air produced by the firm in country} is xi

= ai+

& . As stated, the SNGA's welfare is the

difference between total clean air and the sum of government and firm transfers. In the rest of this
paper, when there is no possibility of confusion, I shall suppress the country superscript. It should
be understood that the focus is on country j. The SNGA's contract can only be conditioned on what
the SNGA observes, i.e., the government's report, r, and the firm's production of clean air, x.
There are four states of nature, each occurring with probability 11 > 0 , where ~ Pi = 1.
In the ex ante case, the SNGA, the government, and the firm sign the contract holding symmetric
but imperfect information about 8 . In the ex post case, the contract is signed after the resolution of
the uncertainty about 8. The firm always observes 8 before choosing its abatement level. The
government, on the other hand, mayor may not observe the firm's private information. This
depends on whether the government's monitoring device functions or malfunctions. As a result, the
government's signal, s, mayor may not be informative. I can now characterize the four states:

lIThe reader should note that although the government's utility function is defined only over transfers, this
government does care about the firm in its country endogenously. This is because the government' s transfer depends
on the firm ' s actions when bribes are allowed. See section 5 for more details.
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*State 1:

The firm and the government both observe

*State 2 :

The firm observes

eand the government observes nothing.

*State 3 :

The firm observes

8 and the government observes nothing.

*State 4:

The firm and the government both observe

8.

8.

In state 1, the firm and the government observe the low abatement quality parameter. The
government's monitoring device works and hence yields useful information. In state 2, the firm
observes the low abatement quality parameter but the government observes nothing. In this state,
the government's monitoring device malfunctions. In state 3, the firm observes the high abatement
quality parameter and the government observes nothing. Once again, the government's monitoring
device fails. Finally, in state 4, the firm and the government observe the high abatement quality
parameter.
The timing of the game between the SNGA, the government and the firm in the ex ante case
is as follows . First, the SNGA offers a contract to the government and the firm. Second, the firm
observes

e and the government receives its signal s. Third, the firm chooses abatement a .

Fourth,

clean air x is produced by the firm and the government sends its report r to the SNGA indicating
what it observed. Fifth, the SNGA compensates the government and the firm with transfers G(x,r )
and 1( X,lJ . When contracting is ex post, the uncertainty is resolved first and then the contract is
signed by the players.
I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the government report r . In other
words, if the government's signal s is noninformative, then the corresponding report r reflects that
fact, and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are indeed as they have been reported. In symbols,

s=0

==>

r = O. On the other hand, to keep the SNGA' s design problem interesting and to allow for
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the possibility of government/firm collusion, I shall permit the government to lie and report that its
signal is noninformative when such is not the case. 12 That is,

S =

e

=>

rE{

e, 0 }.

This completes

the description of my model. I now consider the benchmark case in which perfect information is
acquired by the SNGA.

3b. The First Best Optimum
In this case, the SNGA observes

e and the firm's abatement choice.

When this happens, the

SNGA bypasses the government and contracts with the firm directly. The government receives its
reservation transfer Grand hence its reservation utility
~ {a j i
max a(. ~i

subject to (1 a)

li T

j -

g( a)] z B r

,

+ nJ
OJ

-

~,

in all states. The SNGA solves

i}
- Tir - Gr
g i(a i)
j
'

Vi, and (lb) if z ~\ji{ T/

+ gi( a/) +

(1)

G/} . Using the fact that

the firm participation constraints in (la) hold with equality, the first order necessary conditions are

dg1( a J/da:-

=

1/( 1

+

y), 'Vi , j, where y is the multiplier on the budget constraint (1 b) and a* is

the first best level of pollution abatement. We see that in the first best optimum, the marginal cost
of pollution abatement for country j is set equal to the reciprocal of one plus the marginal welfare
of the SNGA's funds. The optimal level of abatement a* is state independent; as such, the firm
receives a transfer for abating pollution which is also state independent. This transfer is
where g*

==

~ +g *

g( aJ.

It is not possible to definitively determine whether the SNGA's budget constraint binds in

equilibrium. To see this, note the following. The SNGA's welfare function exhibits constant
marginal welfare in the authority's own funds . As contrasted to this, the funds spent making

12In this scenario, lying by the government is restricted to states 1 and 4. Alternately put, reporting the wrong
state is equivalent to obtaining a noninfonnative signal.
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transfers do not exhibit constant marginal welfare. As a result, it is possible that in equilibrium, the
SNGA will disburse only a part of

M because

the effect of such disbursement on clean air

production drops below one before the SNGA exhausts
exhausts

M

The second case in which the SNGA

M before the effect on clean air production drops below one is also possible.

Which case

will prevail depends on the curvatures of the Bl[ e], and particularly the gl( e) functions. In the rest
of this paper I shall assume that the curvatures of these functions is such that the budget constraints
bind in equilibrium. From a practical standpoint, this is clearly the more relevant case. I now
discuss the more interesting cases in which the SNGA cannot determine the realization of e or the
actual abatement undertaken by the firm.

4. The No GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case

4a. Ex Ante Contracting (Identical DCs)
Since the contracting is ex ante, the SNGA, the government, and the firm share symmetric
but imperfect infonnation about

e.

When the government is paid G1" it obtains its reservation utility

V1" and hence it is fully insured. Further, since I am not allowing for collusion between the
government and the firm and because the SNGA can verify the government's report, by paying G1"
the SNGA obtains the government's information at least cost. This means that the three-tiered
hierarchy reduces to a two-tiered hierarchy in which the government plays a passive role.
In this setting, the SNGA solves
max{T;,a;}~'vf p

subject

to

(2a)

~iPiB[J;-g(a)] ~

/a i + ei -

Br ,

(2b)

T)
~

(2)

-g(a3 )

~ - g(a2 ) ~ T3 - g(a3 + ~e) , and (2d) ~iPJM -~ Vj{ G/

+ T/]

~ T2

~ o.

-g(a2

-~e),

(2c)

Inequality (2a) is the
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firm's participation constraint. Inequalities (2b) and (2c) are the firm ' s incentive compatibility
constraints. These constraints arise because the SNGA has imperfect information about

e in states

2 and 3. These are also the states in which the government's signal s is noninformative. Constraint
(2b) says that in state 3, the firm should not claim that the state is 2. Similarly, (2c) says that in state
2, the firm should not claim that the state is 3. Inequality (2d) denotes the SNGA' s budget
constraint. Note that because all DCs are identical and because there is no aggregate uncertainty,
it makes sense to have an ex ante budget constraint. If the relevant countries are not identical, (2d)
will have to be replaced-as in section 4b-by an ex post budget constraint. I can now solve the
SNGA's problem as stated in (2)-(2d). I am led to
Theorem 1: The optimal lEA is one in which (i) the SNGA obtains the government's information

at least cost, (ii) the government's reward is Gr in all states, (iii) the pollution abatement levels
satisfy

q = a 3 = a4 > a2 , (iv) the firm transfers satisfy I; > Tl = T4 > T2 , and (v) at the

optimum, all the constraints except (2c) bind.
Proof' See the Appendix.

Theorem 1 describes the pattern of pollution abatement one may expect to observe in my
stylized N identical DC world. Since the SNGA acquires the government's information in states 1
and 4 and because this information is verifiable, the firm's abatement is the same in these two states.
The optimal contract then specifies TI = T4 . On the other hand, in state 2 or 3, the SNGA' s
information is imperfect. To prevent the firm from lying about the true

e, the optimal contract now

specifies T3 > T2 . The optimality of this contract stems in part from the feature that the SNGA
rewards high abatement with a high monetary transfer and "punishes" low abatement with a low
transfer. The level of abatement in the low quality state 2 is lower than the level in the other states.
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This makes it less desirable to abate pollution at a low level in state 3. It is not possible to directly
compare the abatement levels described in Theorem 1 with the first best level of abatement a*. This
is because a* depends on the multiplier y, which is specific to the first best problem.

4b. Ex Post Contracting (Heterogeneous DCs)
I now consider the case in which all the DCs are heterogeneous. The SNGA is unable to
contract with the government and the firm in country j until the uncertainty about

e has been

resolved. Once again, with no collusion, the government plays a passive role. It receives its
reservation utility and hence it is fully insured. The SNGA solves
max {ai' T}'fv
.p(a.
+ e.
- T)I
i
I
I
I
I
subject to (la), (2b), (2c), and (3a)

M-

~'f{ G/

+

(3)

T{} ~ 0 , \:Ii .

From (Ia) we see that as opposed to the ex ante case, in this ex post case, it must be
individually rational for the firm to contract with the SNGA in every state. Put differently, in this
setting, the SNGA cannot compel the firm to abate pollution if doing so would involve making a
loss. Inequality (3a) denotes the ex post budget constraints. Because the contracting countries now
are heterogeneous and because the contracting is ex post, a stronger notion of budget balance-as
embodied in (3a)-must be used. Inequality (3a) says that when the SNGAs contracts with DCs
independently, this authority's monetary obligations cannot exceed

it

regardless of the state. Note

that this ex post setting is characterized by asymmetric information. The SNGA does not know the
state of nature; the firm does. The timing of the underlying game now is such that the uncertainty
is resolved first and then the players contract. In this setting, the optimal contract has the properties
stated in

14
Theorem 2: The three-tired hierarchy reduces to a two-tiered hierarchy in which (i) the SNGA

obtains the government's information at least cost, (ii) the government's transfer equals Gr in all
four states, (iii) for

i

=1=

2, ai = (g I) -I {P/(Pi + Yi) },

Algi (a l ) =A:$ /(a3 ) =A$ I (a4 ) > ~g/(a2)' (IV)

~

= (g I) -I {P !(P2

J; -g(a3 ) > ~ -

+ Y2) -

D }, and

g(a l ) = T2 -g(a2 ) = T4 -g(a4 ) ,

and (v) at the optimum, all the constraints except (la, i = 3) and (2c) bind. 13
Proof- See the Appendix.

I now comment on some aspects of the optimal ex ante and ex post contracts. Inspecting
Table 1, we notice two important differences. First, in the ex ante case, a l

=

a 3 = a 4 > a 2, and in the

/
ex post case, A1gt a l ) =A 3g (a3) =A 4gta4 » ~gta2) ' where the AiS are weights.

These

weights are functions of the respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers and the state probabilities. In
particular, we see that whereas the ex ante contract equalizes the actual level of abatement in states
1, 3, and 4, the ex post contract equalizes the weighted marginal cost of abatement in these three
states. In both contracts, the level of abatement is lowest in the low abatement quality state 2.
Second, in the ex ante case, the gross payoffs to the firm-which satisfy

J; > TI

=

T4 > T2 -can be

characterized explicitly. However, in the ex post case, only the net payoff to the firm can be
characterized explicitly. These net payoffs satisfy

J; - g (a3 ) > ~ - g( a 1 )

=

T4 - g (a4 )

=

T2 - g (a2 ) ·

Because the government' s report is verifiable, and because the government does not collude
with
~

the

-g(a1 )

firm,
=

optimal

T4 -g(a4 )·

insurance

for

the

firm

under

both

regimes

requires

that

Further, in these no-collusion cases, incentive problems are limited to

states 2 and 3. In these states, the optimal contract must reward truth telling. As such, in the ex ante
case, we have T3> T2, and in the ex post case, we have

13For

J; - g(a 3) > T2 - g( a 2 ).

exact representations of D and the Ai' see the proof of Theorem 2 in the Appendix.

Finally, I note that
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Table 1. The No-GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Contracting

Contracting

Ex Ante

Ex Post

q,

q, V i

Pollution abatement level
and pattern
Transfers to the government

Vi

Payoffs to the polluting fIrm

in both cases, ~ - g( a3 ) >

T;. - g(a l )· This feature of the two contracts tells us that an optimal

contract will reward truth telling in the high abatement quality state when the government is unable
to convey an informative report to the SNGA.
I now proceed to consider the effects of government/firm collusion on the optimal contract
designed by the SNGA.

5. The GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case

Sa. Ex Ante Contracting (Identical DCs)
Recall that because countries are sovereign, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions
of the government and the firm or enforce the terms of the agreement in the event of a contractual
breach. Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm's private information and must rely on the
government's report to design the optimal contract, an efficient contract must not only be
individually rational and incentive compatible, but it must also be collusion-proof. 14

14See footnote 9 as well.
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I shall model collusion between the government and the firm as follows . In the ex ante case,
before the resolution of the uncertainty regarding abatement technology quality and at the time of
signing the main contract, i.e., the contract between the SNGA, the government, and the firm, the

firm and the government sign a secondary contract which entails the offer and acceptance of a bribe
b(. , .) from the firm to its government. This secondary contract is unobservable by the SNGA. The
bribe is a function of the government's report, r, and the firm's production of clean air, x With the
offer and acceptance of this bribe, the firm's total transfer becomes {T (. ) - b (r , x ) } and the
government's total transfer is {G ( • ) + b (r , x) } .
Collusion by the firm and the government alters the incentives of the various parties and-as
we shall see-the nature of the optimal contract offered by the SNGA. To see why the firm might
want to bribe its government in our four-state world, consider state 4. In this state, the government
is indifferent between reporting that it has observed

eand reporting that it has observed O.

However, the firm would prefer that the government report O. This is one instance in which a clear
rationale exists for the firm to bribe its government.
In order to formulate and solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall appeal
to the "equivalence principle" (Tirole 1986, p. 195) and restrict myself to collusion-proof contracts.
Tirole's method involves imposing constraints in addition to the usual participation and incentive
compatibility constraints. These additional constraints are designed to preclude government/firm
collusion and hence make the main contract collusion-proof. Denoting the collusion-proof transfers
-

-

to the government and the firm by G and T, the SNGA solves
max {G
-

T-

'5'. ,-, .p l a . +

i' i, air- v I

I

~

I

e. - G. - T.)
I

I

I

(4)
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subject to (2a)-(2d), (4a)
--

G4

+

T4 - g(a J

+

T2 - g (a 2)

-

G2

-

~i Pi V(

-

G) ~ V r , (4b) Gl

--

~

G3

~

G3

+

--

+

T3 - g(a3),

+

T3 - g (a3 + L18 ) .

-

-

-

(4d)

G3

+

T3 -g (a3)

Tl - g( a l )
~

-

~

--

G2

+

T2 - g(a2) , (4c)

-

G2

+

T2 - g(a2 - L18) , and (4e)

-

Inequality (4a) is the government's participation constraint. Inequalities (4b) and (4c) are
the core collusion constraints. Recall that in states 1 and 4 the government's signal s is informative.
In these two states, the government can hide this fact. Given this, constraints (4b) and (4c) tell us
that should the firm bribe its government, then the total sum of the transfers less the cost of pollution
abatement in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding totals in states 2 and 3,
respectively. Finally, (4d) and (4e) tell us that it must not be possible for the government to bribe
the firm. More specifically, (4d) tells us that in state 3, the government should not be able to bribe
the firm to abate at the level that is optimal for state 2. Similarly, (4e) tells us that the government
should not be able to bribe the firm to claim that the state is 3 when it is 2. Solving the SNGA' s
problem (4) subject to (2a)-(2d), and (4a)-(4e), I can state

Theorem 3:

The optimal contract with government/firm collusion is one in which (i)
----

al

=

a3

=

a 4 > a 2, (ii) G4 > G 1 > G2 = G3 , (iii)

---~ > T4>
> T2 ,

r;.

(iv) G4 + ~

--

=

G3 + T3 , and (v) all

the constraints except (2c), (4b), and (4e) bind at the optimum.

Proof· See the Appendix.
To intuitively verify that the contract described in Theorem 3 is indeed collusion-proof, I
have to show that constraints (2a)-(2d) and (4a)-(4e) are satisfied. By part (v) of Theorem 3,
constraints (2a), (2b), (2d), (4a), (4c), and (4d) are satisfied. The proof of Theorem 3 tells us that
constraints (2c), (4b), and (4e) hold as strict inequalities.
collusion-proof.

Thus the equilibrium contract is
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Note that the SNGA is worse offwhen the government and the firm collude. This is because
in the collusion case, the number of binding constraints exceeds the number of binding constraints

in the no-collusion case. However, if the SNGA does offer the contract with the features described
in Theorem 3, then his total monetary transfers cannot be altered by changing the government's
report or the firm's abatement level. As such, the SNGA can be sure that his monetary obligations
will be those described in Theorem 3. This is so because the equilibrium contract is collusion-proof
I now comment on some of the noteworthy features of the contract described in Theorem 3.
From Theorem 3(i) and Table 2 we see that collusion per se has no qualitative effect on the pattern
of pollution abatement. Note also that it is not possible to be explicit about the deviation in the
abatement levels specified in Theorem 3 from a*, because this first best level of abatement depends
on a multiplier that is specific to the first best problem.
Part (ii) and Table 2 tell us that in the collusion case, the government is rewarded for the
-

-

usefulness of its report. In states 2 and 3, the government reports truthfully. Thus, G2

=

G 3 ' On

the other hand, in order to encourage the government to tell the truth about what it has observed in
state 4, the government's reward is high; by a similar line of reasoning, the government's reward

Table 2. Ex Ante Contracting Without and With Collusion

Contracting

Without Collusion

With Collusion

q,

G4 > G 1 > G2 = G3

Pollution abatement level and pattern
Transfers to the government
Transfers to the polluting firm

-

Vi

-

-

-
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in state 1 is low. The transfers in states 4 and 1 exceed those in states 2 and 3 because in states 4
and 1 the government may lie and hence the SNGA has to establish the right incentives. This is in
contrast to the situation in states 2 and 3 where there is no possibility of lying. This active
governmental role in the collusion case contrasts with the no-collusion case in which the government
plays a passive role and receives its reservation transfer in every state.
Part (iv) of the theorem says that the total payments from the SNGA to the government and
the firm in states 3 and 4 are equal. However, by part (iii) the transfers to the firm between these
two states vary. Why is this so? In state 3, the firm can lie about the abatement quality parameter
that it has observed and the government will not be able to tell the difference between truth telling
and lying

beca~se

its signal is noninformative. In order to prevent the firm from lying, the firm ' s

reward in state 3 is higher. On the other hand in state 4, the government's signal is informative.
Now the government has to be induced to report truthfully with a higher transfer, and the firm' s
reward is correspondingly lower. From Table 2, we see that in the no-collusion case,

~

= T 1 . This

is because the SNGA acquires the government's verifiable information at least cost and because the
government reports truthfully. On the other hand in the collusion case,

~

-

> Tl holds. This is

because in the collusion case, the SNGA must create incentives so that the dual objectives of
preventing collusion and encouraging the firm to act truthfully in the high abatement quality state
are achieved.
Finally, part (v) tells us that (4b) does not bind at the optimum. This is because when the
firm observes the low abatement quality parameter, the government's report does not make a
difference since the firm voluntarily prefers to abate pollution at the low level.
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5b. Ex Post Contracting (Heterogeneous DCs)
I now study the case of heterogeneous DCs in which there is collusion between the DC
government and the firm. The SNGA is unable to get the relevant players to contract until the
uncertainty about 8 has been resolved. Denoting the collusion-proof transfers to the government
-

-

and the firm by G and T, the SNGA solves
max {Gi ' f i,a; } ~ 'vf p1. (a.1 +8 1. -G 1. -T.)
1

(5)

-

subject to (Ia), (2b), (2c), (3a), (4b)-(4e), and (Sa) KG)

2

V r , Vi . The optimal contract has the

properties stated in

-

-

-

-

(iii) G4 > G 1 = G 2 = G3

=

Gr , and (iv) at the optimum all the constraints except (la, i = 3,4), (2c),

(4e), and (Sa, i = 4) bind. Is
Proof" See the Appendix.
Part (iv) of the theorem tells us that with the exception of (la, i = 3,4), (2c), (4e), and (Sa,
i

=

4), all the other constraints are satisfied. The proof of Theorem 4 tells us that constraints (la,

i = 3,4), (2c), (4e), and (Sa, i = 4) hold as strict inequalities. Hence, the contract described in

Theorem 4 is indeed collusion-proof.
A comparison of the optimal ex ante and ex post contracts when there is government/firm
collusion can be made with the aid of Table 3. There are four essential differences. First, while the
ex ante contract equalizes abatement levels in states I, 3, and 4, the ex post contract equalizes the

15For an exact representation of D and the ~, see the proof of Theorem 4 in the Appendix.
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Table 3. The GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Contracting

Contracting

Ex Ante

Ex Post

Pollution abatement level and
pattern
-

G4 >

Transfers to the government

-

-

q >G

-

2

-

= G3

-

-

-

G4 > Gj =G 2 =G 3
~

Payoffs to the polluting firm

= Gr

-

-

- g(a 3 ) > T4 - g(a 4) > Tj - g(a 1 )

-

=T2 - g( a2 )

weighted marginal cost of abatement in these three states. The weights Ai are functions of the state
probabilities and the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers.

Second, while the ex ante contract specifies

----

G4 > G 1 > G2

=

- - - -

G 3' the ex post contract specifies G4 > G 1

=

G2

=

G3

.

In both cases, the

government's signal is noninformative in states 2 and 3. As such, the optimal ex ante and ex post
-

-

contracts specify G2

=G3. Further, the government can lie about its signal in states 1 and 4. In
-

-

order to induce truth telling by the risk-averse government, both optimal contracts specify G4 > G 1.
Third,
-

~

In

the

ex

-

- g( a3 ) > T4 - g(

ante

aJ =

~

case,

-

Tl - g(a 1 )

-

-

> T4> Tl> T2,

whereas

In

the

ex

post

case,

-

=

T2 - g( a2 ) · In both cases, the highest gross and net payments,

respectively, are in state 3. This encourages the firm to tell the truth about 8 when the government
is unable to convey an informative report to the SNGA. Finally, while in the ex ante case, 6
constraints-(2a), (2b), (2d), (4a), (4c), and (4d)-bind at the optimum, in the ex post case, 13
constraints-CIa, i

;/=

4), (2b), (3a), (4b), (4c), (4d), and (Sa, i

;/=

4)-bind at the optimum. This

means that the SNGA's expected welfare when he designs country specific lEA's can be no greater
than when he designs a single contract for all the relevant DCs. This also tells us that when there
is government/firm collusion, the SNGA will prefer to design a single contract rather than N
country-specific contracts.
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Finally, consider the differences in the optimal ex post contract, without and with collusion.
The essential features of these two contracts are illustrated in Table 4. From this table, we see that
collusion has no qualitative impact on the pattern of equilibrium pollution abatement. However, the
quantitative impact is almost certainly different because, in general, the weights Ai and
-

4,

will be

-

unequal. The transfers to the government are almost unchanged; the only change- G4 > G 1 in the
collusion case-reflects the need to establish incentives so that the government reports truthfully
in the high abatement quality state 4. The net payoff to the firm in both contracting regimes exhibits
the same qualitative pattern. In the collusion case though, the transfers are designed so that the
equilibrium contract is collusion-proof.

6. Conclusions

In this paper I analyzed the question of environmental protection for identical and
heterogeneous DCs within the framework of the directives set forth in the various agreements
reached at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. I modeled the institutional setting for the underlying

Table 4. Ex Post Contracting Without and With Collusion

Contracting

Without Collusion

With Collusion

q.,

G4 > G) =G 2 =G 3 = Gr

Pollution abatement
level and pattern
Transfers to the
government

-

\Ii

-

Net payoffs to the
polluting fInn

~

-

-

-

-

-

- g(a 3 ) > T) - g(a)) > T2 - g(a 2)
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problem as a three-tiered hierarchy with N forks, and then I studied the nature of the optimal, budget
balanced ex ante and ex post contracts, without and with collusion. A number of policy conclusions
emerge.
First, although it is generally more desirable to account for the heterogeneity of Des by
designing country-specific lEAs, the SNGA will prefer not to do so. Alternately put, the SNGA will
prefer to treat Des as identical and design a single contract. This is because the SNGA' s payoff,
when he contracts ex ante, is typically higher than his payoff when he contracts with the various
Des ex post. However, it should be noted that in the context of Des, unless the SNGA can limit the
ex post liability of the players, nations may well refuse to participate in ex ante contracting schemes.

This tells us that there is a potential conflict between the kind of lEA a SNGA is likely to want and
the kind of lEA that is likely to be favored by Des.
Second, because of the nature of the lEA design problem, and because most of the incentive
constraints and all the budget constraints bind, we typically cannot expect that the SNGA's designed
contracts will elicit the first best level of abatement. However, this question cannot be definitively
resolved because the contractually specified abatement levels cannot be directly compared across
the five contracting scenarios.
Third, the qualitative features of the optimal lEAs depend on the timing of the underlying
game between the SNGA, the government, and the firm. Whereas in the ex ante case, the pattern
of abatement and the gross payoffs to the government and the firm can be characterized explicitly,
such is not the case in the ex post case. Further, while the ex ante contract equalizes abatement
levels in three of the four states, the ex post contract equalizes the weighted marginal cost of
abatement in these three states. This means that if the SNGA cannot get the relevant parties to

24
contract ex ante, the resulting contract will be more complex. In this more complex contract, the
level of pollution abatement will depend on the marginal welfare of the SNGA's funds and on the
state probabilities.
Fourth, several observers, such as Rogers (1993, p. 236), have worried that many of the Earth
Summit directives". . . offer a back door option by which signatories can excuse themselves at a
later date if the going gets too tough." The implementability of ex post contracts should diminish
such concerns because an ex post contract can be viewed as a limited liability contract. In this sense,
as compared to an ex ante contract, an ex post contract is more likely to be renegotiation proof.
Fifth, the research of this paper tells us that a SNGA can indeed circumvent the monitoring
and enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty by designing collusion-proof
contracts.
With talk of rising disparity between the South and the North and the increasingly
acrimonious nature of international discussions regarding the use of environmental resources, the
design question studied in this paper takes on a particular significance. This is in no small measure
due to the fact that the implementation of such agreements will do more to engender and maintain
international security than will most strategic or unilateral policy measures.
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Appendix

In this appendix, I provide the proofs of the four theorems stated in the text of the paper. All
the proofs involve Kuhn-Tucker analysis.

Proof of Theorem 1: I shall proceed by means often steps. The Lagrangian to (2)-(2d) is 16
~ = J:vjpj(xj-T)+ afVj pIJ[e]-B ,.}+ P{T3-g(e)- T2 +g(e)}

y

where a,

p,

(a)

T/} ]},

and yare the multipliers corresponding to (2a), (2b), and (2d), respectively. The

first -order

necessary

a{aB[eyaJ;}

= 1+(P/p2)

<E

(a5)

{~\i Pi [M - ~\?f { G,! +

conditions

are

+y , (a3) a{aB[e]/aT3}

t e ]g I (a 1) = 1,

( a 6)

(a1)

= 1-(Pp3)

(a2)
+y , (a4) a{aB[e]/aT4}

= l+y ,

aB t e ] g I ( a2) = 1 + ( pp 2)g I (a 2 - Ll8 ) ,

( A 7)

[aBte]+(pp3)]g/(a 3) = 1, and (a8) aBte]g l(a4 )= 1 .

Step 1: (2d) binds at the optimum.
Proof' This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b . •
Step 2: (2a) binds at the optimum.
Proof' From (a1) a = 0

~y

= -1. This is impossible. Thus a> O. •

Proof' (a1) and (a4) give T;. -g(a 1 )= T4-g(a 4 )· Using this and manipulating (a5) and (a8), I get
Now it follows that

T;. = T4 ·

•

Step 4: (2b) binds at the optimum.

16

1 shall check later to see that (2c) is satisfied.

q

=

a4 ·
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Proof" P=0,(a2),and(a3)tellusthat
0> g ( a2 )

-

g( a2

-

118).

~ -g(a 3) = T2 -g(a2 ).

This is impossible. Thus,

Usingthisequalityin(2b)gives

p> 0. •

Step 5: a4 >a2 .

Proof" (a4) and (a8) give (1

+

y)g I (a 4) = 1 . (a2) and (a6) tell me that (1 + y)g I (a 2) < 1. From

these two expressions, I get g l (a4) > g I( a2 )

Step 6: a3

=

=*

a 4 > a2 . •

a4 .

Proof" From (a3), (a4), (a7), and (a8), I get (1

+ y)g l(a3 )

= (1 +

y)g l(a4 )

=*

a3 = a4. •

Step 7: ~ > T2 .

Proof" This claim follows because
Step 8:

~

~

•

> Tl .

Proof" (a1) and (a3) give
Step 9:

p > 0, and a3 > a 2'

~

- g( a3 ) > Tl - g( a l

)·

Because

q

a3 , I conclude that

~

> T1 ·

> a2, it follows that

~

> T2 . •

=

•

> T2 .

Proof" (a2) and (a4) give

~

-

g(a~

> T2 - g(a2 ) " Because

~

Step 10: q = a3 = a4 >a2"

Proof" This follows from steps 3,5, and 6 . •
Finally, I shall check to see that (2c) is satisfied.
g(a3 + 118) - g( a3 ) > g( a2 ) - g( a2 - 118) .

This is equivalent to showing that

This inequality holds because q > a2, 118 > 0,

g l > 0, and g il> 0 " This completes the proof of Theorem 1. • •

Proof of Theorem 2: I shall proceed by means of seven steps.17 The Lagrangian is

S£ = ~ViP/ Xi -

17r

T) + ~Vi

(Xi

{B[. ] - B r} + P{T3 - g(. ) - T2 + g ( • ) } + ~Vi YJ M - ~Vi { G j" + 7;i} ], (b)

shall check later to see that (2c) is satisfied.
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where q,
The

p,

Yi' i

=

first -order

~ {aB[eyaT2 }

1, ... ,4 are the multipliers corresponding to (Ia), (2b), and (3a), respectively.
necessary

conditions

= P+ Y2 +P2' (b3)

~ {aB[eyaT3 }

alB I[ e] g I( a1) =P l '

(b 5 )
{af3 I[ e] +

P} g/(a3) = P3'

are

(b 6 )

(b 1)

= Y3 -

C1 { aB [ e ]I aT1 }

=

Y1 + PI'

(b2)

P+P3' (b4) a4{ aB [e]/a~} = Y4 +P4' and

~ B I [ e] g I( a2 )

= pg I (a 2 - Lie ) +P 2 '

(b 7)

and (b8) ~BI[e]g1 (a 4) =P4 .

Step 1: The budget constraints bind at the optimum.

Proof· This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b . •
Step 2: For i::l= 3, ai > o.

~

= 0 =* Y1 = -PI' which is impossible.

From (b 1) C1

Proof·

= 0 =* Y 2 = -(p2

(b4) a4

+

P),

which is impossible, irrespective of whether

Thus C1 > 0 .

P ~ o. Thus,

From (b2)
~ >

o.

From

= 0 =* Y 4 = -P4 ' which is impossible. Thus a4 > o.•

Step 3: (2b) binds at the optimum.

Proof· From (b3)

P= 0 =* a3> o.

is impossible. Thus,

Using this result in (2b) gives 0> g(a2) - g(a 2 - Lie). This

P> o. •

Step 4: (1 a, i = 3) is slack at the optimum.

Proof·

~ > 0,

P> 0 tell us that ~ - g ( a3) = T2 - g ( a2) + { g( a2) - g ( a2 - Lie ) } =

In turn, this tells us that

Step 5:

~

- g(a3 ) > Tr =*a 3 = o .

~ -g(a3 ) > T1 -g(a 1)

•

= I;. -g(a2) = T4 -g(a4) ·

Proof· This follows because C1 > 0, cx 2 > 0, a 3 = 0 , cx4 > o. •
Step 6: For i::l=2, ai = (gl)-l {p/(p i +y)}, a2 = (gIrl {P;(P2 + Y2) -D},
D = {P ~ (P2 +Y 2) - g

I(

a2 )

} .

~. + {

D}, D> o.
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Proof·

From (bI) and (b5) I get

q

=

(gIrl {p/(P l +y l )} .

From (b3) and (b7) I get

~ =(gl) - 1{P~(P3+Y3)}' From(b4) and (b8), I get a4= (gl) -1{P:(P4+Y 4 )}' Finally, from (b2)
and (b6) I get ~

=

(g l) -1 {p;(P2+y 2)-D} . •

Step 7: ~gl(al) =A3g l (a3) =A$/(a4»~gl(a2)' where Ai = {I +(y:p)} .

Proof· From the proof to step 6, it follows that {I +(Y~2)} g I( a2) < 1 = {I +( y:p)}g I (a) ,
i=I,3 , 4 . •

Finally, I shall check to see that (2c) is satisfied. This can be verified in a manner analogous
to that employed in the proof of Theorem 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 2 . • •

Proof of Theorem 3: I shall proceed by means of 13 steps. The Lagrangian is 18
~ = ~ViPi(Xi

-

-

-Gi -T)

+ u{~ViPiV(e)

-

-

-

- Vr } +a{~ViPiB[e] -B,.}
--

-

+ p {T3 - g (e) - T2 + g (e )} + E { G 4 + T4 - g ( e) - G3

-

T3 +g ( e) } +

K{G3 +~ -gee) -G2 -~ +g(e)} +Y{~\t Pi [M-~Vj {G/ +T/}]},
where v, a,

(e)

p, E, K, and yare the multipliers corresponding to (4a), (2a), (2b), (4c), (4d), and (2d),

respectively.

The

first -order

necessary

conditions

are

(c 1)

uV I (

G1 )

=

1 + y,

( c2)

tV / (G2) = 1 +y +(K/P2) , (c3) tV / (G3) = 1 +y +(E - K) lp 3' (c4) tV /(G4) = 1 +y - (E l p 4),

(c5) aaB[eya~ = 1 + y, (c6) c8B[e]/aT2 = 1 + Y +( P +K)lp2' (c7) aaB[eyaT; = 1 +y +(E- P -K)lp3'
( c 8 )

( c 9 )

( cIa)

aB I [e]gl(a2) = 1 +{(P +K) lp2 }gl(a2 -Ll8), (cII) {aBI[e] + (P -E + K)P3}gl(a3) = 1, and(cI2)

{aBte] +Elp4}g l(a4) = 1.
Step 1: (2d) binds at the optimum.

Proof· This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b . •

18

1 omit (2c), (4b), and (4e) temporarily. Later, I shall check to see that these constraints are satisfied.
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Step 2: (4a) binds at the optimum.
Proof· Substituting u = 0 in (e 1) yields y = -1. This is impossible. Thus,

U

> o.•

Step 3: (2a) binds at the optimum.
Proof· Substituting ex

0 in (e5) gives y

=

=

-1 . This is impossible. Thus, ex > o. •

Step 4: (2b) binds at the optimum.

-

-

From (2b) I get ~ - g( a3 ) ~
-

-

~

Using

g( a2

-

~

>G 2 and

-

T2 -

-g(a3) >

- ~e)

~

-

>

T2 -

-

- g(a2 ) I get

= O.

K

-

~

- g ( a2 ) >

T3 -

g ( a3 )

·

-

g( a2 )· Substituting this in (eI3), I get G3 >G2 .

This last inequality violates (2b) . Thus,

Now (e6) and (e7) give

P> o. •

Step 5: (4d) binds at the optimum.
Proof- Recall that

p > o.

K

-

impossible. Thus,

K>

0

=?

= 0, (e2), and (e3) tell us that V( (

3

)

> Vi (G2 )

=?G3 < G2 .

This is

-

G3 = G2 .

•

Step 6: (4e) binds at the optimum.
ProofE

E

= 0, (e2), (e3), and ~ = G3 tell us that UVI( (

2

) ;/=

u Vi (G3 ). This is impossible. Thus,

>0 . •
-

-

Step 7: G4 > G 1 .
Proof-

E

> 0, (el), and (e4) tell us that

V (G4 ) < V I(G 1 )

=?

G4 > G1 .

•

Step 8: a 1 =a3 = a4 = (g /r 1{ 1/( 1 +y)}.
Proof·

From (e5) and (e9) I get

q = (girl {1/( 1 + y)} .

~ = (g I) - 1{ 1/(1 +y)} . From (e8) and (e 12) I get ~ = (g I

Step 9: a2 < ai' i = 1, 3 ,4 .

r

1{

From (e7) and (ell) I get
1/( 1 +y ) } . •
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Proof· From (c5) and (c9) I get (1

+ Y )gl (a 1) = 1. From (c6) and (cl0) I get (1 + Y )gl (a 2)

< 1.

From these two expressions it follows that gl ( a 2) < g I( a 1) => a 2 < a 1. •
-

-

Step 10: G1 > G2 .
Proof·

(cl) and (c2), gIve

V( 0 1 ) = (1 + y)/u, and V (02 ) = { (1 +y )/u} + K!P2U .

VI (.) < 0, it follows that ~ > O2 ,
-

-

•

-

-

Step 11: G4 > G 1 > G 2

Since

G3 .

=

Proof· This follows from steps 5, 7, and 10 . •
-

-

Step 12: G4 + T4

-

=

-

G 3 + T3 ·

Proof· This follows because E > 0, and a3 =a4
Step 13:

~

-

-

.

-

> T4 > TI > T2·
-

-

-

-

-

-

Proof· (c5), (c6), (c8), and B"[.] < 0 give ~ - g( a 4) > Tl - g(a 1) > T2 - g( a 2) => T4 > Tl > T2·
-

-

-

-

Combining this with steps 11 and 12 yields ~ > T4> Tl > ~ . •
Finally, I need to check that (2c), (4b), and (4e) are satisfied. The fact that (2c) holds as a
strict inequality can be verified in a manner analogous to that employed in the proof of Theorem 1.
-

-

-

-

Given this, (4e) also holds as a strict inequality because G2 = G 3 ' Finally, (4b ) is satisfied because G1 > G 2
-

and because

-

r;. - g ( a1 ) > ~ - g( a2 ) .

This completes the proof of Theorem 3 . • •

Proof of Theorem 4: I shall proceed by means of 13 steps. The Lagrangian is 19
~

-

-

= ~ \iiP i( Xi - Gi - T) + ~ \iP: i {B [.] - Br }

+ ~\iYi { V(.) - ~.} +P {

-

-

T3 - g (.) - T2 + g (. ) }

+

(d)

19r

will check later to see that (2c) and (4e) are satisfied.
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where

a i' V i'

p,

El' K ,

Yi , i = 1 , 2,3, 4, 1= 1, 2 are the multipliers associated with (la), (Sa),

(2b), (4b), (4c), (4d), and (3a), respectively.

qVI(G I )

(dl)

(d2)

=PI-EI +Yl'

The first-order necessary conditions are

V2VI«]2)=P2+EI+K+Y2'

(d3)v3VI(G3)=P3+E2-K+Y3'
-

<1 { aB [ e ]I aTl } = PI -

( d S )
-

~{aB[e]laT2} =

(d6)

P2 +P

+E l +K+ Y2,

-

a4 {a B [e ] fa T4

( d 8)

} =

P4

-

(d7)

~ + Y4 '

~

E I

+

Y1 '

-

{aB[e]l aT3} = P3 +E 2 -

P - K + Y3 ,

( d 9 )

(d 10) {a j1 I [e ] - EI } g I( a2) =P 2 + { P + K} g I( a2 - ~ e ), (d 11) {a jJ I [e ] + P - E2 + K} g I( a3) =P 3'
and (d 12) {a fl I [e ] + E 2 } g I ( a4) = P4 .

Step 1: The budget constraints bind at the optimum.
Proof· This follows by assumption. See the related discussion in section 3b . •
Step 2: (Sa, i = 2) and (la, i = 2) bind at the optimum.
Proof· From (d2) l1
and K~ O.

=

0 => Y2

Thus, l1 > 0 .

irrespective of whether

=

-(p2 + E I + K). This is impossible irrespective of whether ~ ~ 0

From (d6) ~ = 0 => Y2 = -(p2 + P + EI + K

P~ 0 , E I ~

).

This is impossible

0 , and K~ O. Thus, ~ > O. •

Step 3: (Sa, i = 1) and (la, i = 1) bind at the optimum.
Proof· (d 1) tells us that q
or (ii) a?O , VI >0.

<1 >

0, VI

= EI =

0 is impossible. (d 1) and (dS) tell us that either (i)

If (i) holds, then (4b) is slack and

~ =

<1

= VI =

0,

O. But this is impossible. Thus,

> O. •

Step 4: (Sa, i = 3) binds at the optimum.
Proof·
~B I[ e] +P = 0 => a3 = P = O.

Substituting

this

In

(d7),

I

get

If the state 3 participation and the incentive compatibility constraints
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-

are slack at the optimum, then the SNGA can increase his welfare by lowering
Thus,

~

~.

But this violates Y3 >

o.

>0 . •

Step 5: (2b) binds at the optimum.
Proof·

If

P=

0, then (d3) and (d7) tell us that

0> g(a2 ) - g(a 2 -d8) . This is impossible. Thus,

~>O .

Using this In (2b) yields

P> O. •

Step 6: (4d) binds at the optimum.
Proof·

P>0~T3-g(a3)=

-

-

-

T2 -g(a 2 -d8). Because G2 =G3, IconcludethatK>O . •

Step 7: (1 a, i = 3) is slack at the optimum.
-

-

Proof· P>O, a2>0~T3-g(a3) =T2 -g(a2 )+{g(a2 )-g(a2 -d8)} = ~.+{D}, D>O . Intum,
-

this tells us that ~ - g( a3) > Tr~a3 =

o .•

Step 8: (1 a, i = 4) and (5a, i = 4) are slack at the optimum.
Proof· (d4) and (d8) tell us that either (i)
is violated . Thus,
-

-

0:4

0:4 >

U 4>

0,

0, or (ii) 0:4 = U4 =O. If (i) holds, then (4c)

= u4 =o .•

-

-

Step 9: G4 > G 1 = G 2 = G3 = Gr .
Proof· This follows because 'i > 0, u 2 > 0, u3 > 0, u4 = o . •
Step 10: (4b) and (4e) bind at the optimum.

-

-

-

-

Step 11: ~-g(a3»T4-g(aJ>Tl-g(al) =T2 -g(a2 )·
Proof· This follows because a4 = 0,
Step

12:

For

0: 1 >

0,

0:2

>0,

E2

> O. •
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From

Proof'

(d5)

and

(d9),

(d7)

and

(d11),

and

(d8)

and

(d12),

I

get

q=(g / rl{p/(pj +Y)}, i= 1,3,4. From(d6)and(d10),I geta2=(g l)-I{p/(p2 +y 2 )-D} . •
Step 13: A1g1(a1 ) =A-~ I (a3 )

From

Proof'

{I

+ ( Y/

(d5)

and

= A-¢' I (a 4) = 1 > ~gl(a2)' A-j = {I +( Yip)}.
(d9),

(d7)

and

(d11),

and

(d8)

and

(d12),

I

get

P2) }g I ( a2 ) < 1. Hence, the claim follows .•

I now check to see that (2c) and (4e) are satisfied. The satisfaction of (2c) can be verified
as in the proof of Theorem 1. Having shown that (2c) is satisfied, to verify that (4e) is satisfied, it
-

suffices to note that from step 9, G2

-

=

G3' This completes the proof of Theorem 4 . • •
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